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More than one hundred years ago, the United States Supreme Court stated:
"The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is
the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law."' The Court has long
demanded that lower courts "be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of
the factfinding process" and "carefully guard against dilution of the principle that
guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt." 2
Though acknowledging that "[t]he actual impact of a particular practice on the
judgment of jurors cannot always be fully determined," the United States Supreme
Court has stressed "that the probability of deleterious effects on fundamental rights
calls for close judicial scrutiny."3
Nevertheless, psychological factors surrounding the order of presentation at
trial do impact the fact-finding process in ways not often examined. This article
will discuss the basic, powerful psychological principles at play in seemingly
minor aspects of the trial structure that dramatically affect the outcome for criminal
defendants who may never truly receive due benefits of the presumption of
innocence.
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I Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
2 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970)).
Id. at 504 (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133
(1955)).
581
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
The fundamental right to a presumption of innocence is one that the
prosecution should have to overcome purely through the presentation of probative
evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But the presumption of innocence is
significantly diluted when the prosecution is given a preferred status of influence
on the jury. This preferred status results from powerful psychological principles
known as the primacy effect, the priming effect, the framing effect, and the
perseverance effect.
This article proposes to give defendants control of the trial structure through
five independent options: to conduct the first voir dire, to deliver the first opening
statement, to present evidence prior to the prosecution's case, to cross-examine a
prosecution witness before direct examination, and to present the first closing
argument. Each choice would be independent of the others, and would afford the
presumption of innocence a better chance of surviving until the jury deliberates.
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES IMPACTING EVIDENCE PROCESSING
Human judgments can be influenced or even determined by subtle
psychological influences.4 The primacy,s priming, and framing7 effects are
among these influences.8 Overarching these influences is the concept of the
perseverance effect, which gives these already powerful persuasion tools a
particularly pungent punch.9 These basic principles will be briefly described
below.
A. Primacy Effect
The primacy effect emphasizes the presentation relationship between those
facts and observations "with the strength of the earlier items in the list exaggerated
over those presented later."o The ultimate judgment is manipulated "as a function
4 Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State's Role in the Accidents of Sex and
Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1380-81 (2009) (citing RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Ian Ayres, Menus
Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2006); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211 (2003); Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159
(2003)).
GORDON B. MOSKOwITz, SOCIAL COGNITION: UNDERSTANDING SELF AND OTHERS 45
(2005).
6 ELLIOT ARONSON ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 56-57 (7th ed. 2010).
7 MosKowTrz, supra note 5, at 33-34.
8 See, e.g., id. at 408.
9 ELLIOT ARONSON ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 66-67 (6th ed. 2007). This is also called the
Confirmation Bias, but in the context of combining psychological principals, this effect is better
described as causing a presumption to persevere over future information.
10 MosKowITz, supra note 5, at 45.
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of the information that comes earlier."" Information that comes later is therefore
not given proper weight, effort, or evaluation when it is factored into the final
judgment.12 For example, if you are told a phone number, list of names, or series
of events, the first numbers, names, and events will be the most likely to be
remembered. Thus, even without changing substance or presentation form,
ordering factors may have a significant impact upon judgments people make and
can impact whether key factors are recalled or overlooked.
B. Priming Effect
"Priming," a considerable factor impacting fact-finders and fact-finding, is the
process by which recent experiences increase the likelihood that a related
presumption" will be a factor in decision-making.14 The presumption created by
priming largely affects the decisions one makes about ambiguous facts.'5  For
example, if one passes someone on the street who is mumbling, walking funny,
and making random noises and strange faces, most would consider this behavior
odd. Seeing someone act odd like this after reading about alcohol abuse will likely
result in the presumption that the odd behavior is the result of drunkenness. By
contrast, seeing the same event, but this time after reading about mental illness,
will likely result in the presumption that mental illness is the cause of the odd
behavior.17 Simple priming can dramatically affect the presumed causation of
behavior.
Experiments that demonstrate priming follow a typical pattern: a priming task
has subjects incidentally exposed to information that will later be related to a
judgment, which is then followed by the related judgment tasks. 8 Consider the
following simple experiment. Say "silk" quickly five times. Now answer the
question: "what do cows drink?" The answer is below, as to not spoil it for fast
readers.19 This example demonstrates that the order is key to the effect. Repeating
words is a very effective method of priming, but is not required for a priming
11 Id
12 Id. at 213.
13 Psychologists frequently use the more technical phrasing "accessible information" within a
schema, rather than using the word presumption. I have chosen to use the word presumption, as it
flows better with the legal doctrine I will discuss later.
14 ARONSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 56-57.
15 Id.; Brook K. Baker, Beyond MacCrate: The Role of Context, Experience, Theory, and
Reflection in Ecological Learning, 36 ARIZ. L. REv. 287, 345 (1994).
16 ARONSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 56-57.
'7 id.
' MOSKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 408.
19 If you said "milk," you are wrong. Cows drink water; they produce milk. Most people will
say milk because the "ilk" sound is primed, and milk is a word often associated with cows.
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effect; repetition of ideas (such as guilt) is equally effective. 20 However, priming
is a quick, unconscious, and unintentional phenomenon based on whatever the
subject happened to be thinking of earlier. 2 ' Thus, while words are frequently used
to establish the "prior thought" aspect of the concept, they do not have to.
Priming typically requires four conditions: applicability, ambiguity,
assertibility, and awareness. 22  The first, applicability, means that whatever
presumption has been primed must be relevant to the judgment to be made.23 If a
decision is completely unrelated to the priming task, the judgment will be
unaffected by it.2 4  Continuing the "silk cow" example, it would be far less
effective to say silk quickly five times, and then ask what color the sky is. Further,
as the priming increases on a given presumption, the more readily a person's mind
will default to that presumption, and the brain will broaden its criteria for
applicable judgments.25 Thus, a strong prime will result in even judgments only
remotely relevant being affected by the primed presumption.26 The opposite is true
as well; a strong relationship to the prime will allow a weak prime to have an effect
on the judgment.2 7 This is because the primed perceiver is ready to see what he
has been primed to see, applicability is expanded, and factors otherwise
overlooked, but linked to the specific constructs that were primed, are used to
bolster the judgment that the priming produces.28
Second, priming requires applicability to an ambiguity in the situation in
order for a judgment to be made.29 Without ambiguity, one is left simply
observing, and not judging the situation; thus, the primed presumption would have
little effect.30 For example, if you say silk quickly five times, and are asked, "what
is in your hand," you will simply look in your hand and observe the answer. Or, if
someone is acting oddly, but is being escorted from a mental hospital in a strait
jacket, then mental illness will be the conclusion, not drunkenness. The ambiguity
element is thus essential for an effective prime to have an impact.
20 Martin J. Pickering & Victor S. Ferreira, Structural Priming: A Critical Review, 134
PSYCHOL. BULL. 427, 437 (2008) (citing Martin J. Pickering & Holly P. Branigan, The
Representation of Verbs: Evidence from Syntactic Priming in Language Production, 39 J. MEMORY &
LANGUAGE 633 (1998)).
21 ARONSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 58.
22 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 409.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 409-10.
25 Id. at 410.
26 Id. at 410-11.
27 Id. at 412.
28 Id. at 411-12.
29 Id. at 412.
30 id
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The third condition for priming is assertibility. If a situation goes beyond
ambiguity to unintelligible, the primed presumption will have no effect.3' Simply
put, a primed presumption will fill in small gaps of information actually requiring
informational gaps, but will not fill large, incongruous gaps of information. Also,
the presumption must be free to fit into the small 3aps; thus social constraints may
inhibit a primed presumption from being used. Additionally, once a socially
inhibited presumption becomes free to be expressed,33 or a person feels free to
express a judgment regardless of the acceptability of the presumption,34 that
presumption will be empowered.3 s
Finally, before priming can create a meaningful presumption, the subject of
the priming must not have awareness of the priming.36 As alluded to above, the
mind must consider the primed presumption as its own, and not the result of an
outside influence; particularly, if the influence is not one the subject is open to, the
person will take steps to remove the impact of the priming on their judgment.
Thus, the safest form of priming is hidden, whether by distraction39 or
subliminally (i.e., indirectly). 0 Effective priming must be done with little or no
notice by the subject, whether directly or indirectly, to avoid conscious
overpowering.41
With all four factors present in the proper conditions, priming can have a
profound effect on judgments in many situations. Thus, the person priming may
have significant power to shape the conclusions another person reaches in
ambiguous situations.
C. Framing Effect
Framing is a process whereby communicators, consciously or unconsciously,
act to construct a point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be
interpreted by others in a particular manner.42 Frames operate in four key ways:
they define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest
31 Id. at 412-13.
32 Id. at 413.
3 For example, racism is easier to express at a Klan rally than an NAACP meeting.
34 For example, a company's owner will usually speak more freely than the employees on any
subject.
3s See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 413.
3 Id. at 415.
37Id.
31 See id. at 415-16.
3 Such as where the tasks were presented as separate, but were together. Id. at 410-11.
4 Such as where tasks covertly incorporated priming stimuli. Id. at 415-16.
41 Id. at 416-17.
42 Jim A. Kuypers, Framing Analysis, in RHETORICAL CRTICISM: PERSPECTIVES IN ACTION
181, 182 (Jim A. Kuypers ed., 2009).
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remedies. 43 Frames are often found within a narrative account of an issue or event,
and are generally the central organizing idea."
The framing effect may be the most complex and fluid of the psychological
principles that cause errors in judgment.4 5 While priming will create presumptions
that affect judgment passed on ambiguous observations, the framing effect can
actually alter the perceived meaning of concrete data.46 Altering identical
scenarios exclusively through different frames can have dramatically different
effects on judgment.4 7 Framing can be done "fortuitously, without anyone being
aware of the impact of the frame on the ultimate decision."48 Framing can also be
used both inadvertently (which is most common) and "deliberately to manipulate
the relative attractiveness of options."49
Regardless of the chosen form or skill of hiding it, proper framing will also
determine whether the judgment ascribes positive or negative features to a person
or event.50  By simply altering how presented facts are framed, even serious
judgments can be manipulated, such as which parent should have custody of a
minor child.51 If the judgment is based on awarding custody, for example, the fact-
finder will focus on positive characteristics of the person seeking custody.52
Conversely, if the question is whether to revoke custody, the fact-finder will focus
on the negative characteristics.53 Although the presented characteristics are the
same, the outcome of life-altering decisions can be completely reversed through
the framing of concrete facts.54 (This effect has also been seen to occur in medical
decision-making: when given the option for radiation therapy, subjects are 26%
more likely to say yes to the treatment if the mortality rate is 0% the first year, and
43 Id
4 Id. As an example of such a narrative account, see JIM A. KUYPERS, BUSH'S WAR: MEDIA
BIAS AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR WAR IN A TERROlUST AGE 8 (2009).
45 Cf Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional Thinking: The Heuristics Problem in Feminist
Legal Theory, 28 CARDOzo L. REv. 391, 395-97 (2006) (observing "the framing effect" to be one
"cognitive distortion" that people use "to make decisions about probabilities," an idea posited in light
of the fact that "decisionmaking often involves an abundance of information, time pressures, and an
array of possible alternatives").
46 MosKOwITz, supra note 5, at 31-33.
47 See id. at 32-33.
48 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES, VALUES,
AND FRAMES 1, 10 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
49 Id.
5o MosKowITz, supra note 5, at 33-34; see also id at 34 (citing Yoav Ganzach & Yaacov
Schul, The Influence of Quantity of Information and Goal Framing on Decision, 89 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 23 (1995)).
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10% the second, as opposed to a 100% survival rate the first year, but 90%
survival rate the second.55)
In addition to judgment on important concrete details being affected,
irrelevant details can profoundly influence judgments as a result of effective
framing.56  "Often people's preferences are unclear and ill-formed, and their
choices will inevitably be influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting
points."57 Effective framing can not only elevate the impact of objectively
irrelevant data, it can also reverse the impact of that data. 8  Because framing
affects what people do and do not perceive, it intrinsically prevents overcoming the
created presumption simply by thinking harder; therefore it will drastically alter
what people think and do even in dire circumstances that demand careful
judgments.5 9
Finally, "[t]he framing of options affects judgments not only on factual
questions but on moral ones as well."6 o Once an issue is framed in one context, the
context that follows will also be subject to the initial framing.61 It is evident that
the power of the primacy effect would also come into play, and this is not the only
time these principles build off of each other. Therefore, a speech, evidence, or
characterizations presented early in the decision-making process will hinder the
acceptability of later speeches, evidence, or characterizations both directly and
indirectly related to the initial frame.
D. Perseverance Effect
An umbrella principle to the presumption-creating principles of primacy,
priming, and framing, is called the "perseverance effect." 62  People have a
tendency to hold onto beliefs that they have already established, even when faced
with evidence to the contrary. People cling to the early pieces of information that
have quickly formed64 into a presumed judgment to avoid ambiguity, uncertainty,
5s James N. Druckman, Using Credible Advice to Overcome Framing Effects, 17 J.L. EcON. &
ORG. 62, 74-75 (2001).
56 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 34.
s7 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 4, at 159 (emphasis omitted).
58 See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 34-35.
' Id. at 35.
6 Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information
Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962,1045 (2005).
61 Scott Medlock, NRA = No Rational Argument? How the National Rifle Association
Exploits Public Irrationality, 11 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 39, 45 (2005) ("[T]he initial frame through
which an issue is understood shapes interpretation of additional facts and observations.").
62 See ARONSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 66.
63 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 213.
6 The perseverance effect is a very fast process where the effect of the initial impression can
last as a byproduct of the brain's tendency to fill in the gaps in what it perceives. It also creates
unwillingness on the part of a believer to admit that their cognition was erroneous. See generally Lee
5872011]
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and inaccuracy.s Beyond simple evidence to the contrary, if the facts used to
create the primed, framed, or primacy-created presumption are discredited, the
judgment will persevere. Even in a courtroom, if a jury hears information that is
later demonstrated to be untrue, the belief can persist.67 The presumption initially
created can be so powerful that it survives even complete discrediting.68
These forces have been demonstrated through various "debriefing paradigm"
experiments. Subjects begin by analyzing fictitious evidence in support of a
hypothesis. 69 Then researchers measure their attitude toward the validity of the
hypothesis. 70  The subjects then learn that the evidence was fictitious, and
researchers then re-measure the subjects' attitudes about the hypothesis.71 Within
the range of change, at least some of the initial beliefs have been shown to remain
in all of the subjects.7  The strength of these presumptions will sometimes survive
overwhelming evidence to the contrary; even if the subjects are convinced that the
evidence was false, belief in the initial conclusion remains.
III. APPLICATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INSIGHTS TO THE STRUCTURE OF TRIAL
The American trial system lends itself to each one of the psychological
pitfalls discussed above at nearly every stage of the proceeding. Currently, courts
make some attempt to reduce psychological influences on the jury by, for example,
removing shackles from defendants prior to the jury entering. But these measures
fall short of true protection of the defendant's presumption of innocence and right
to be convicted only based on the evidence presented. While such steps contribute
to a fair trial, they do nothing to address the psychological imbalance in favor of
the prosecution as a result of its presentation position; thus, reform needs to occur
Ross, Mark R. Lepper & Michael Hubbard, Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception:
Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 880
(1975); Judith Tutin, BeliefPerseverance: A Replication and Extension ofSocial Judgment Findings,
Paper Presented at the 91st Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association (Aug. 26-
30, 1983), microformed on Educational Resources Information Center ED240409 (U.S. Dep't of
Educ.).
65 MosKowITz, supra note 5, at 365.
6 ARONSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 66.
67 id
68 id
69 Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins
and Maintenance ofErroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES 129, 147-49 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
70 id.
72 ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 99-100 (1999).
n Craig A. Anderson, Mark R. Lepper & Lee Ross, Perseverance of Social Theories: The
Role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 1037, 1042 (1980).
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that takes that power and gives it to the defendant. In order to do this effectively,
while continuing to hold the prosecution to its burden of proof, defense attorneys
should have an option to order trial presentation.
A. Current Problems Facing the Presumption ofInnocence
Courts have long recognized that factors other than evidence can impact and
even skew a jury verdict. Currently courts have procedures to reduce
psychological influences on the jury. However, they fall short of their ultimate
goal: protecting defendants' presumption of innocence.
1. Current Efforts and Doctrines Seeking to Avoid Undue Prejudice
"The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment," 74 and "[t]he presumption of innocence, although not articulated in
the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal
justice."7 As the United States Supreme Court points out in its important ruling in
Estelle v. Williams, the judiciary has long fought to eliminate practices that
heighten the risks of unfair prejudice degrading the presumption of innocence
almost without exception. The Federal Judicial Center in its criminal pattern jury
instructions, for example, suggests that the presumption of innocence be discussed
with the jury immediately at the start of any instructions.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has stressed that "[d]ue
process requires that the accused receive a [fair] trial by an impartial jury,"78 and
lower courts have held true to the principle that "[n]o insinuations, indications or
implications suggesting guilt should be displayed before the jury."79 The United
States Supreme Court has declared that when courtroom practices create "an
'unacceptable risk . . . of impermissible factors coming into play,' there is
'inherent prejudice' to a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial and reversal
is required."80 Even in situations where some form of prejudicial treatment in front
of the jury is permissible or even required, courts work to minimize the impact on
74 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172
(1975)).
75 id
76 Id. at 504.
7 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1-6 (1987)
[hereinafter PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS] (reciting jury instruction I and providing commentary regarding
the instruction). Even here we see recognition of the power of presentation order.
7 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
7 Boswell v. Alabama, 537 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d
619, 624 (5th Cir. 1967)).
s0 Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 656 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated, Carey v. Musladin, 549
U.S. 70 (2006) (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570 (1986)).
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the jury.s Although prejudicial factors cannot always be avoided,82 current
doctrines require an "essential state policy" before permitting the unavoidable
83factor to continue.
For example, numerous courts have held, and the United States Supreme
Court affirmed, that "an accused should not be compelled to go to trial in prison or
jail clothing because of the possible impairment of the presumption so basic to the
adversary system."84 The United States Supreme Court reasoned that, at a capital
trial, "[t]he defendant's clothing is . . . likely to be a continuing influence
throughout the trial."8 s Prior to that, the United States Supreme Court held that
when "placing a jury in the custody of deputy sheriffs who were also witnesses for
the prosecution, an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming
into play."86 The Court has also held that "the Constitution forbids the use of
visible shackles" at the guilt phase and even the penalty phase of a capital trial.
Lower courts have further prohibited spectators from wearing anti-rape buttons as
they sat in the gallery.88
As essential as these various methods are, current efforts fall short of
protecting the presumption of innocence. The psychological ramifications of the
prosecution presenting first at every stage of a trial, and most sub-parts of those
stages, has resulted in an unnecessary and a potentially highly prejudicial
psychological effect on jury decision-making. It is now time for the courts to
eliminate this very powerful, prejudicial, and avoidable aspect of trial practice that
should have no place in a jury's verdict.
81 See Lopez v. Thurmer, 573 F.3d 484,490-93 (7th Cir. 2009).
82 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-44 (1970).
83 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976).
8 Id. at 504 (citing Gaito v. Brierley, 485 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1973); Hernandez v. Beto, 443
F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967); Miller v. State, 457 S.W.2d
848 (Ark. 1970); People v. Zapata, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963); Eaddy v. People, 174 P.2d
717 (Colo. 1946); People v. Shaw, 164 N.W.2d 7 (Mich. 1969); Commonwealth v. Keeler, 264 A.2d
407 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970); ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRIAL BY JURY § 4.1
(b) (Approved Draft 1968)).
8s Id. at 505.
8 Id. (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466,473 (1965)).
87 Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005); see also Earhart v. Konteh, No. C-1-06-62,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63816, at *22-25 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 29, 2007) (citing several cases for the
same proposition).
88 See, e.g., Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1990).
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2. Psychological Basis for the Presumption of Guilt
Although courts have sometimes acknowledged psychological factors such as
priming,89 they are not recognized as a matter of course. When making decisions
about trial structure, courts have a responsibility to address the psychological
principles affecting fact-finders because even the simple fact of being a juror can
alter judgments. 90 Primacy, priming, and framing are quick, unconscious, and
unintentional,9' but have a powerful and lasting effect. 92 Yet courts fail to consider
such effects by continuing to give prosecutors the benefits of these potent forces
and, in turn, withholding them from the defendant.
As previously discussed, the primacy effect is the result of judgments being
made "with the strength of the earlier items in the list exaggerated over those
presented later."93  Consequently, the traditional order in criminal jury trials
inherently benefits the prosecution. By going first, the prosecution's arguments,
evidence, and rhetoric will be placed before, and in turn get exaggerated over, the
defendant's. In addition to the inherent primacy effect benefiting the prosecution,
the status quo gives the prosecution the first chance at priming members of the jury
and framing the argument. Thus, the exaggeration that results from primacy will
include the priming and the framing effects already benefiting the prosecution's
presentation. 94 Finally, the perseverance effect may give the prosecution the only
chance to prime the jury and frame the arguments. This forces the defendant to
overcome an even steeper presumption in favor of the prosecution. Regardless of
the evidence, this psychological battle in a criminal trial should be uphill for the
government, not for the defendant, with regard to the jury's presumptions.
The perseverance effect leads people to cling to early and quickly created
presumptions when forming a judgment in order to avoid ambiguity, uncertainty,
and inaccuracy.95 The need to avoid ambiguity, uncertainty, and inaccuracy is
particularly high in a criminal trial, where jurors are intrinsically aware and
repeatedly reminded that they are tasked with resolving ambiguities and asked to
decide, with certainty, issues with high stakes that call for assurances of accuracy.
Thus, simply by virtue of the role they are given, jurors are more susceptible to the
perseverance effect than other subjects would be otherwise. This vulnerability to
89 See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1503 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
9 See generally Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community Values in
Juries: How "Legal Priming" Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 1059
(2005).
91 See ARONSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 58.
92 See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 213.
1 Id. at 45.
9 See infra pp. 592-96.
9 MoSKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 365.
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influence makes whatever presumptions are formed early in a trial particularly
damaging to the opponent, who is permitted to address them only later.
The potential damage posed by these forces can be severe: with juries
psychologically inclined to ignore subsequent evidence that could directly
contradict the prosecution's evidence, defendants can face the primed, framed, or
primacy-created presumption of guilt that cannot be readily overcome simply with
argumentation and evidence of impeachment. Any ultimately weak evidence later
presented by the defense-even if no weaker than the evidence presented by the
prosecution-will be discounted, as the prosecution benefits from psychological
presumptions.96  Thus, many defendants will be particularly vulnerable to the
perseverance effect affecting the verdict in their cases. Even in a courtroom where
the jury has been told to keep an open mind, if the jury initially hears information
that only later is demonstrated to be untrue, a false belief can unreasonably
persist.97
As discussed before, people have a tendency to hold onto beliefs that they
have already established, even when faced with direct evidence to the contrary.98
In a criminal trial context, beliefs are likely to be formed earlier rather than later.
Globally, this means either during the prosecution's opening or during its case-in-
chief; on a more micro level, this means during the prosecution's direct
examination. These formed beliefs will then be held onto even when faced with
the defendant's arguments or evidence presented to the contrary. Though jurors
are instructed not to form beliefs early in the trial, natural psychological forces will
still prompt belief formation.
The priming effect is present and favors the prosecution in every trial.
Though this effect may not always actually affect trial outcomes, the four
conditions of priming-applicability, ambiguity, assertibility, and awareness9 9
are all nonetheless always present. In fact, each condition may be necessary for a
trial to occur. Lawyers and jurors are forced to have each condition present, either
by law, jury instruction, or circumstance.
First, every trial-related act an attorney does, including those with a priming
effect, must be applicable to the case. "To be admissible, evidence must be
relevant."lo" Indeed, to be useful, evidence must be relevant; everything an
attorney does should have applicability to the disputed issue at hand. Additionally,
even ancillary evidence will bolster the case of the earlier primer. For example,
even if the judge allows only minimally relevant information to be admitted at a
trial, or an attorney gives only a minimally relevant oratory, priming will result in a
default to the created presumption and broaden the jurors' criteria for applicable
9 See ARONSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 66.
97 id.
9 MosKowiTz, supra note 5, at 213.
9 Id. at 409.
' United States v. Lawson, 494 F.3d 1046, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing FED. R. EVID. 402,
403).
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judgments.o'0 Finally, even if an attorney does not consciously utilize the power of
priming, or is ineffective in doing so, a strong relationship to the prime will allow
even a weak prime to have an effect on judgment.102 This principle is more likely
to be involved than the former principle because even the worst attorney should be
able to recognize whether evidence and arguments have a strong relationship to
their case. Thus, even if the priming opportunity is wasted, by simply using
evidence that has a good relationship to the case, the prosecution will have an
advantage based on priming.
Second, ambiguity is also obvious in the trial context. No one doubts that
trials involve ambiguous facts-a trial without ambiguity is simply a waste of
time.103 In fact, not all of the actions courts take described in the previous section
are present in every case. Further, juries are the "finder[s] of fact and weigher[s]
of credibility,"' " tasks both inherently involving ambiguity. Likewise, if the judge
takes on this role, she too will have a task with inherent ambiguity. While the law
may not produce ambiguity in all trials, circumstances can certainly lead to such a
result.
Third, the primed presumption must be free to be asserted. 05  During
deliberations, jurors are free to make decisions, inferences, and presumptions, and
to make them free from second-guessing.'0 6 Judges, as fact-finders, are also free to
make decisions, inferences, and presumptions about the facts (although maybe
more subject to second-guessing from attorneys). In addition to the explicit legal
right to views on evidence, regardless of who the fact-finder is, the very role of
fact-finder means that views are freely asserted.
In addition to this third condition for effective priming being present in trials,
the law compounds the effect of priming. When the once inhibited presumption-
created and reinforced during trial-becomes free to be expressed during
deliberations, that presumption will be empowered. 0 7 This inhibition leading to
empowerment is particularly present in the jury trial context.'08  Jurors are
101 See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 409-10.
102 See id. at 412.
103 Admittedly, some trials are clear-cut, but the fact that some criminal trials cannot be
psychologically influenced is not a reason to ignore the concerns created within the majority oftrials.
'" United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984).
105 MOSKOWITZ supra note 5, at 413.
10 See, e.g., PATTERN INSTRUCTIONs supra note 77, at 3 ("Your deliberations will be secret.
You will never have to explain your verdict to anyone.").
107 See MOSKOWITZ supra note 5, at 413.
108 See, e.g., PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS supra note 77, at 3-4:
During the course of the trial, you should not talk with any witness, or with the
defendant, or with any of the lawyers in the case. Please don't talk with them about any
subject at all. In addition, during the course of the trial you should not talk about the trial
with anyone else-not your family, not your friends, not the people you work with. Also,
you should not discuss this case among yourselves until I have instructed you on the law
and you have gone to the jury room to make your decision at the end of the trial.
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instructed at the beginning of most trials not only to not discuss their forming
opinions, but to not form definitive opinions at all until the close of evidence, 09 a
nearly impossible feat. By bottling up the forming presumptions and encouraging
jurors to ignore the presumptions being formed by the evidence and the arguments
of the prosecution, the priming is all the more pervasive.
Fourth, and finally, the subject of the priming must not have awareness of the
priming,"i0 meaning the most powerful form of priming is hidden,"' whether by
distractionl12 or subliminally (indirectly)."' 3 While jurors know they are there to be
persuaded, the fact of primingll4 is not likely to be immediately noticed by the
average juror. Jurors usually are not trained to, and therefore do not, recognize the
subconscious presumptions that are being created by the presentation order; thus
they cannot or do not make the necessary effort to counteract the effects. In
addition, distractions abound: new place, new tasks, new people, and so on. With
jurors being bombarded with information, it is not a stretch to conclude that most
do not notice that the forming opinions they should not be thinking about are
present.
The framing effect may be the most powerful psychological tool in the
courtroom. While prosecutors enter a setting prepared for priming, and enhanced
by the primacy position, they also receive an additional opportunity: the framing
effect. "[A]droitly framing the question is an important part of argumentation,
often taught to students in advocacy courses as a technique for increasing their
ability to be persuasive in pursuit of the pre-determined goal of victory for their
client . . . .""' What most attorneys do not realize is that this "important part of
argumentation" is primarily, if not exclusively, for the benefit of the first presenter.
In criminal cases, that is the prosecution.
By simply altering how presented facts are framed, even serious judgments
can be altered."'6 For example, government programs" 7 are often named to induce
109 United States v. Akpan, 407 F.3d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the district court
instructed the jury "not to form an opinion until they had heard all of the evidence"); United States v.
Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 1983) (observing that the trial court judge "admonish[ed] the
jury not to engage in pre-deliberation discussions concerning the case and not to form an opinion
until [the case] was submitted to them for decision"); Chambers v. Kincheloe, No. 94-35586, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 2729, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 1995) ("[T]he jury should not form an opinion until
the close of the evidence.").
110 MOSKOWITz, supra note 5, at 415.
.. See id. at 415-16.
112 Such as where the tasks were presented as separate, but were together. Id. at 410-11.
113 Such as where tasks covertly incorporated priming stimuli. Id. at 415-16.
114 As well as the other psychological tools at work.
11s Francis J. Mootz III, Nietzschean Critique and Philosophical Hermeneutics, 24 CARDOZO
L. REv. 967, 1029 (2003).
116 MOSKOwrrz, supra note 5, at 34.
" For example, "foreign aid" implies that spending money will aid foreigners, rather than
harm them. Ten percent unemployment sounds bad, but 90 percent employment sounds good.
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a certain positive attitude toward them."' 8 Prosecutors clearly get the first chance
to present facts with the first opening, first case-in-chief, first interaction with its
witnesses, and first closing. While primacy is not essential to effective framing,
not only does primacy magnify the effectiveness of the frame, it also sets frames
without competition. With the first chance at framing, each successful, yet
uncontested, frame will likely exclude competition on the given fact or issue.
Once an issue is framed in one context, such as the prosecution's opening or case-
in-chief, the context that follows, the defense opening or case-in-chief, will also be
subject to the initial framing."' The prosecution will not only benefit from the
inherent resistance to challenge within framing, its framing will also be resistant to
defense arguments through the perseverance effect.
The framing effect that prosecutors wield can actually alter the perceived
meaning of concrete data later presented by the defense.120 This can be the most
prejudicial effect that presentation order has on defendants. As suggested in Part
II, the defense can present evidence or data that exonerates the defendant or
discredits a prosecution's witness or evidence, but an adroitly framed fact-finder
will reduce or reverse the meaning of this data. Prosecutors further benefit by
effectively framing a positive or negative judgment of the defendant or the event at
issue.121 Prosecutors can demonize defendants in the fact-finder's mind before the
defendant's behavior can be judged objectively. This aspect of framing is
generally unavailable to defendants, who usually do not have an opportunity to
present an alternative "bad guy." Further, a defense of circumstances, such as self-
defense, may be an uphill battle once the prosecution has set in place a persevering
negative judgment of the defendant. Having an overall frame of criminal activity
can distract or blind the fact-finder during the presentation of exculpatory
evidence. Again, the primacy and perseverance of the prosecution's perspective
will amplify the prejudice toward the defendant.
Effective framing not only can elevate the impact of objectively irrelevant
data, it can also reverse the impact of that data.122  So, if the prosecution
strategically selects facts that are irrefutable and minimally relevant, and then
emphasizes their importance, the defense may begin with an especially high, yet
objectively inconsequential, hurdle. Further, evidence successfully framed by the
prosecution, which objectively may help the defendant, can, if not already done
"Social security" implies that the program can be relied on to provide security for a society.
"Stabilization policy" implies that a policy will have a stabilizing effect.
" E.g., Sara Bleich, Is It All in a Word? The Effect of Issue Framing on Public Support for
US. Spending on HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries, 12 HARV. INT'L J. PRESS/POL. 120, 121-22
(2007) (concluding that support changes when the phrase foreign aid is included or omitted from a
survey question).
119 Medlock, supra note 61, at 45.
120 See MoSKowiTZ, supra note 5, at 31-33.
121 See supra note 50.
122 See MosKowITz, supra note 5, at 34-35.
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within the fact-finder's mind, be spun to harm the defendant's case.123 This can be
particularly damaging if the defense has stressed reliance on that evidence to the
fact-finder. The fact-finder's ultimate conclusion is obvious: "if the defendant
wants me to focus on this evidence that proves his guilt, he must be guilty."
Finally, unlike priming, framing is powerful enough to prevent a juror from
overcoming the created presumption simply by thinking harder, even in dire
circumstances that demand careful judgments. 124 Thus, even if a jury instruction
could be given to prevent framing, no benefit could come of it. Framing effects
result from people's tendency to accept information in the form in which it is
provided, which in turn leads them to analyze the same situation differently
depending on the given reference points or frames.12 5 Further, this leaves defense
counsel to determine which issues, evidence, and arguments were not effectively
framed in order to know where attacks remain feasible-an unlikely, if not
impossible, task given that everyone approaches and perceives situations
differently. This characteristic, independent from the intensification of primacy
and perseverance effects, may create insurmountable barriers to defendants
achieving justice. Compounding this characteristic with primacy and perseverance
effects demands a review of the current system.126
B. Suggested Reform to the Criminal Justice System to Deal with Psychological
Forces
The trial structure should be flexible enough to give defendants the
independent options to: deliver the first opening statement, present evidence prior
to the prosecution's case, cross-examine a prosecution witness before direct
examination, and/or present the first closing argument. Each aspect of this
proposal has independent justification, need, and applicability. The power of the
psychological tools discussed herein should rest in the hands of the defendant. So
doing will provide the best chance at preserving a presumption of innocence, and
confine the prosecution to evidence to achieve proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
absent psychological manipulations. Moreover, given the diverse needs and
opportunities among criminal cases, this right of first presentation should be an
option for the defendant to avoid unintended consequences as a result of
123 For example, small failures in memory denote honesty, but can easily be framed as
evidence of lying.
124 MosKowITz, supra note 5, at 35.
125 B.A. Mellers et al., Judgment and Decision Making, 49 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL., 447, 455-56
(1998).
126 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976) (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)) ("The actual impact of a particular practice on the
judgment of jurors cannot always be fully determined. But this Court has left no doubt that the
probability of deleterious effects on fundamental rights calls for close judicial scrutiny.").
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unforeseen or unavoidable circumstances where the risk of psychological prejudice
is outweighed, either by strategy or by necessity.
Finally, each stage-voir dire, opening statements, case-in-chief, direct and
cross-examinations, and closing arguments-offers a new context subject to the
above-discussed psychological tactics. The principles apply to the overall case as
well as the individual parts. While every later context will be affected by
preceding psychological effects, each stage will have its own points free to be
influenced, and that influence should be at the discretion of the presumably
innocent defendant. In this manner, we can finally begin to have a defendant with
a chance to be presumed innocent, and a prosecution truly held to proof, based on
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt.
1. Defendant's Control is Critical
First, the defendant should be given control of these powerful psychological
tools, as we cannot continue to force the defendant to be tried under these
psychological handicaps if we truly believe that:
Central to the right to a fair trial . . . is the principle that "one
accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined
solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds
of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other
circumstances not adduced as proof at trial."l 2 7
We have seen the various ways that order aids various psychological tools
affecting the outcome of a trial. The current format of a trial favors the
prosecution, which wields these psychological weapons and can thereby unfairly
shape jury interpretations of subsequent evidence.128
By leaving these psychological weapons in the hands of the prosecution,
convictions, particularly in close cases, are more likely to be based on the order
and method of presentation than on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, if
the defendant is allowed to benefit from these tools, then the prosecution will be
forced to overcome the presumptions created by primacy, perseverance effect,
priming and framing with evidence alone. Given the strength of these
psychological principles, whenever prosecutorial evidence of guilt overcomes the
psychological effects now in the hands of the defendant, we can be much more
confident that there is proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
127 Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,
485 (1978)).
128 See Joan K. Archer Rowland, Comment, Communication and Psychology Variables:
Reasons to Reject the Summary Jury Trial as an Alternate Dispute Resolution Technique, 39 U. KAN.
L. REv. 1071, 1095 (1991) (citing RIcHARD D. RIEKE & RANDALL K. STUTMAN, COMMUNICATION IN
LEGAL ADVOCACY 206 (1990)).
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2. An Independent Option is Essential to an Effective Balance of the Burden
of Proof and the Presumption of Innocence
Second, in order for the system to function properly, altering the order must
be an option for the defendant at each stage. In some circumstances, it would
obviously do more harm than good to force the defense to attempt to attack the
prosecution's case before it is even presented. However, if the defense is prepared
to offer a complete version of events, it needs to have the first opportunity to prime
or frame the fact-finder's view of the evidence.
To avoid this prejudice, even in cases when the prosecution must go first,
simply giving the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the witness before the
direct examination 2 9 will provide a chance for the defendant to prime or frame the
testimony and evidence coming through that witness. Of course, every trial is
different: strategy, circumstances, and skills will demand various permutations, but
to be fair to the defendant, and to hold the prosecution to its constitutional burden,
each stage must be open to the defendant benefiting from the persuasive power of
psychological principles, leaving the prosecution to its evidence in meeting its
burden of proof.
3. Ordering the First Opening Statement
Third, defendants will likely select the option to open first most often because
an opening statement can win the trial. Members of juries have been reported to
say that once the opening statements were made there was nothing left to the
case.130 Citing the "primacy" effect, the opening statement can have a profound
effect, especially because information that is presented first has a stronger
impact.13' The primacy power of opening statements is so strong that jurors have
been proven to overlook the lack of any evidence later at trial to support opening
statements' claims. 132  By framing arguments in a certain way, fact-finder's
process the information in such a way that they later recalled hearing the testimony
promised, even though they had not.13 3 Opening is so powerful that "research on
the impact of the opening statement consistently reveals that as many as 80 to 90
129 See infra pp. 599-600 for explanation and logistics.
130 Valerie P. Hans & Krista Sweigart, Jurors' Views of Civil Lawyers: Implications for
Courtroom Communication, 68 IND. L.J. 1297, 1302 (1993) (citing ALFRED S. JULIEN, OPENING
STATEMENTS § 1.01, at 2 (Supp. 1992)).
131 Daniel G. Linz & Steven Penrod, Increasing Attorney Persuasiveness in the Courtroom, 8
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 8-10 (1984) (discussing an experiment which demonstrated "the impact of
first impressions on later judgments").
132 Tom Pyszczynski et al., Opening Statements in a Jury Trial: The Effect of Promising More
Than the Evidence Can Show, 11 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 434, 442 (1981) ("The promise of
persuasive testimony proving the defendant's innocence made jurors more sympathetic to the
defendant's case, even though such testimony was never entered as evidence.").
3 Id. at 442-43.
[Vol 8:58 1598
OVERCOMING PSYCHOLOGICAL HURDLES
percent of all jurors have reached their ultimate verdict during or immediately after
opening statements." 34
4. Ordering the Presentation of Evidence
Fourth, presentation of evidence is likely to be the least sought change in
criminal trials. Most criminal trials are based on attacking the insufficiency of the
prosecution's case. Occasionally a defendant will have an alternative story, and at
such time, should have the right to present that story to a jury without the presence
of prosecution's psychological hurdles. This right will be particularly beneficial
with affirmative defense cases as well. To have a jury sit through sometimes days
of evidence supporting the prosecution will certainly overwhelm any benefit the
defense received from the opening statement. Nevertheless, the strength of the
prosecution presenting with primacy may be diluted with a defense option to cross
prior to direct.
5. Timing the Cross-Examination
Fifth, and possibly the most beneficial across all cases, is the defense option
to cross-examine a prosecution's witness prior to direct examination. This right is
also the most necessary. Allowing a defendant to discredit evidence prior to
presentation will enable the weight of an impeachment to have its true effect. This
is particularly true because of the power the discussed psychological factors have
with regard to simply discrediting evidence, and the vast amounts of criminal cases
that rely on that tactic. By simply hearing testimony, which is implicitly asserted
to be true, jurors will be primarily primed to believe the witness; further, the story
that she presents will frame the perspective the jurors have on not only future
evidence, but also future attacks on the evidence the witness herself presents.
The Federal Rules of Evidence essentially already allow the first examination
to be cross-like. First, Rule 611 allows a party to call a "hostile witness, an
adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party," and then use leading
questions during the examination.135 Although this examination is still called a
direct because the party calling the witness questions first, it demonstrates that the
system can easily function with the first examination being conducted as a cross.
Second, Rule 806 allows the first examination to be conducted "as if under cross-
examination.""' Again, while the calling party still gets the first inquiry, this
demonstrates that the practical effect of defense initially crossing witnesses called
'3 DONALD E. VINSON, JURY TRIALS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WINNING STRATEGY 171 (1986).
1' FED. R. EvID. 611(c) ("When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness
identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions.").
1" FED. R. EVID. 806 ("If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls
the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if under
cross-examination.").
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by the prosecution will be minimal. Thus, since the Federal Rules of Evidence
already supports an opening-cross, the only rule modification needed in federal
court would be to give the defense the right to insert an opening-cross. Therefore,
with the cross being presented first, the psychological implications will stop
prejudicing the defense, and actually put the burden of proof on the evidence the
prosecution can produce to support its case.
The strength of getting to the witness first is already recognized by most trial
attorneys. When putting a witness on the stand with a bad past or a plea-deal,
prosecutors will "draw the sting" by addressing it before the defense does. 137 The
prosecutor is intentionally taking the opportunity to prime the jury to see the
witness' criminal history in a favorable light. The framing of the witness, by the
State, as a good witness notwithstanding his or her past, will then carry over to
defense's cross-examination. This carry-over effect will minimize the defense's
arguments as to why the witness should not be believed. Both sides know that
drawing the sting does not make the witness more credible, but the practice is
evidence that it has some effect.
Criminal history is just one example of why giving the defense the
opportunity to cross before direct is so important. There are many aspects of a
witness' testimony that will have to wait until the first re-cross, but there is a lot
that the defense counsel can address before direct. Defense can challenge based on
physical perspective if the witness is claiming to have seen the event. Defense can
also emphasize the information that the prosecution would want to draw the sting,
such as the plea deal the witness gets in exchange for testifying against the
defendant. Defense would now be able to give the jury a fresh look at the type of
person the prosecution has at the foundation of its case.
This change would enable the defense to re-present its story to the jury
through questions before the prosecution is given the chance to present its story
through the witness. This lead in reminding the jury of the story will create a
presumption in favor of the defendant's burden, or at least remove the assistance
from the prosecution. This will then leave the witness to the evidence and
believability when presenting her story. Thus, whatever inferences are not based
on direct proof will be colored by the defendant. The prosecution will now have
the practical burden to reverse that coloring effect during direct examination with
testimony that will overcome the jury's presumptions beyond a reasonable doubt.
6. Timing the Closing Argument
Sixth and finally, the closing argument should be in the control of the
defendant. Given all that has been discussed thus far, this is likely the least
137 L. Timothy Perrin, Pricking Boils, Preserving Error: On the Horns of a Dilemma After
Ohler v. United States, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 615, 627 (2001) ("The prevailing view, of course, is
that the party should draw the sting of the evidence by preemptively disclosing the harmful material
and should do so as early as possible.").
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consequential for the defendant. Most, if not all, of the psychological influence
will be exhausted. However, if we are to take the United States Supreme Court at
its word, that even if "[t]he actual impact of a particular practice on the judgment
of jurors cannot always be fully determined, [there is] no doubt that the probability
of deleterious effects on fundamental rights calls for close judicial scrutiny,"' 38
then we must also relinquish the closing order to the discretion of the defendant
and his counsel. It is essential to ensure that prosecutors win on proof, and
defendants have the tools to create as much reasonable doubt as possible for the
prosecution's proof to be forced to overcome.
7. Legal Foundation that Allows for Reform
The lack of a legal foundation allowing for reform is a procedural downfall
existing at the federal level and currently present in some states. The power to
correct this injustice exists in constitutional law, rules of criminal procedure, state
and federal statutes, and state supreme courts. Modification to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure does not offend a governmental interest, and thus will likely
be resolvable under the Due Process Clause. Nevertheless, the Constitution does
not need to be the first or only source of remedy. The federal judiciary could
remedy this problem by simply creating a rule of criminal procedure.
States, if the federal change comes by rule, will be individually accountable to
modify the current system. Many states have already demonstrated the legislative
power to enact such reform by empowering courts to institute changes in which
side benefits from the first influence on the jury. For example, Ohio Revised Code
§ 2315.01 "specifically provides that the court, 'for special reasons,' may alter the
order of argument otherwise called for under the statute."' 39 This demonstrates the
Ohio legislature's willingness to give the courts discretion to modify trial structure.
Finally, many state constitutions mirror federal constitutional rights. For
example, the California Constitution states: "A person may not be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law . . . ."140 Additionally, state
jurisprudence is currently open to such a simple reform in present cases: trial
judges have "broad discretion in determining the method by which evidence is
brought to the jury's attention."l 4 1 These various methods of reform should
insulate the proposed change from attacks on jurisprudential concerns about the
applicable constitutional principles, while actually protecting criminal defendants
in a way we have been claiming to offer procedural protections for years.
138 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976) (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965);
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)).
u3 Ferguson v. Dyer, 777 N.E.2d 850, 857 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); see also OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2945.10 (West 2006) (providing that a "court may deviate from the order of proceedings" in a
criminal trial).
'" CAL. CONST. art. I, §7(a).
141 Commonwealth v. Rancourt, 503 N.E.2d 960, 966-67 (Mass. 1987) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Amazeen, 375 N.E.2d 693, 701 (Mass. 1978)).
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IV. CHALLENGES AND RESPONSE
Certainly, an overhaul such as this would be subject to criticism.
Psychologically, there are principles that favor the defense in the current system.
Also, other legal issues, beyond the presumption of innocence, also arise
concerning defendants presenting first. Nevertheless, these principles and legal
issues should generally be a strategic decision addressed by defendants on a case-
by-case basis, and should not be generically predetermined.
A. Psychological Challenges to the Proposal
There are three main psychological factors that reduce or attempt to nullify
persuasion attempts implicated in presentation order. First, the psychological
"goal of being accurate" is likely the most obvious factor to diminish a juror's
susceptibility to presentation presumptions;142 after all, jurors, particularly in a
criminal case, need to be accurate.143 Second, the accountability the jury will feel.
Finally, the expectancy bias the jury has when entering the room.
Once the social pressure from the judge, lawyers, and other jurors combine
with the accountability many jurors feel, primed presumptions may be suppressed
by critical analysis motivated by the desire to be accurate.'" Nevertheless, this
critical thinking will begin with the presumption that the prime is accurate, and the
mind work focused on supporting that presumption before releasing it.'45
Therefore, if a primed presumption can be formed and accepted, that presumption
will be strong unless and until it is overwhelmingly put down both externally by
social pressure to be accurate and as an internal result of critical thinking moving
away from it. Unfortunately, practices like the "dynamite (Allen) charge"
pressures jurors to work together to reach a conclusion,'" thus downplaying the
142 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 214.
143 See id.
'4 See id. at 414-15.
145 See supra Part H.
146 In Allen v. United States, the Court stated that:
While, undoubtedly, the verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each
individual juror, it by no means follows that opinions may not be changed by conference
in the jury-room. The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a
comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves. It certainly cannot
be the law that each juror should not listen with deference to the arguments and with a
distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury taking a different
view of the case from what he does himself. It cannot be that each juror should go to the
jury-room with a blind determination that the verdict shall represent his opinion of the
case at that moment; or, that he should close his ears to the arguments of men who are
equally honest and intelligent as himself. There was no error in these instructions.
164 U.S. 492, 501-502 (1896).
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need to be accurate, and encouraging jurors in close cases to latch on to the
certainty and comfort provided by presumptions created in presentation order.
Next, accountability is likely to be the most powerful safeguard against
presentation order presumptions. People who are told prior to receiving
information that they will be held accountable for the way they use it may be
immune to presentation order influence.14 7 However, jurors are not told this, nor
does the system impose accountability on jurors. 148 While one may presume the
being on a jury would induce a feeling of accountability, studies have shown that
groups of people actually function with a lesser sense of accountability than they
otherwise would as individuals.149  Thus, being part of a jury may reduce
accountability and increase a person's susceptibility to presumptions based on
presentation order.
Further, accountability and the need to be accurate will be reduced by the
expectancy bias jurors bring to the courtroom that a criminal defendant is guilty.
When people expect an outcome, they are more likely reach that outcome, unless
the person feels that the expected outcome is likely'50 to impact them personally.'15
"Research shows that people can counteract the social judgment effects of their
prejudices if they are aware of the potential effects of those prejudices and if their
values or commitments so dictate." 152 Relying on burdening judges with ensuring
jurors are aware of prejudices they may or may not have is unfair, inefficient, and
unlikely to avoid the constant battles inherent in additional processes for criminal
defendants. However, if jurors were somehow made to feel that a conviction was
likely to influence them if they were wrong, the personal "outcome-dependence"
would induce far more critical analysis of the true guilt. 5 3 Nevertheless, the
system would fail to function if jurors had a vested interest in finding not guilty, so
allowing a defendant to change the presentation order is a much better choice to
preserve the presumption of innocence.
147 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 214.
148 John D. Jackson, Making Jurors Accountable, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 477, 477 (2002).
149 E.g. Susan Cunningham, Genovese: 20 Years Later, Few Heed a Stranger's Cries, APA
MONITOR, May 1984, at 30 (discussing Kitty Genovese, who was stalked and brutally murdered in
New York while 38 of her neighbors watched and failed to respond to her screams).
Iso The process of voir dire strives to ensure jurors will not be personally impacted by
eliminating relatives, friends, and anyone with a direct or indirect connection with the case.
'15 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 215.
152 Larry L. Jacoby et al., Lectures for a Layperson: Methods for Revealing Unconscious
Processes, in PERCEPTION WrrHOUT AWARENESS: COGNITIVE, CLINICAL, AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES
81, 84 (Robert F. Bomstein & Thane S. Pittman eds., 1992).
' Id.
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B. Legal Challenges to the Proposal
Finally, on the legal front, changing the presentation order may have dire
implications for the defendant's right to hold the prosecution to the burden of
proof. As discussed above, Ohio's legislature has given judges discretion on
presentation order. However, it has also used its power to dictate rules for
presenting arguments in a trial that courts are either bound to follow or simply
choose to follow.154 One such rule is that the:
Party who would be defeated if no evidence were offered on either side,
first, must produce [his] evidence, and the adverse party must then
produce [his] evidence. . . . The parties then may submit or argue the
case to the jury. The party required first to produce [his] evidence shall
have the opening and closing arguments.'
Nevertheless, a trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a
surrebuttal on the part of the defendant in a civil trial.'56 Unfortunately, that was
because the appellate court felt that the simple change in the order of presentation
and the "restricted scope of the rebuttal" resulted in "little, if any, prejudice."1 57
While this burden of proof is common in all jurisdictions in criminal cases,
the balance of the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence should be in
the hands of the defendant and her lawyer. Given the unique nature of criminal
trials, it is impossible to balance the virtues of a presumption of innocence and the
burden of proof with a uniform rule. Thus, our system should give defendants
control of the trial structure through the independent options to deliver the first
opening statement, present evidence prior to the prosecution's case, cross a
prosecution witness before direct, or present the first closing argument.
V. CONCLUSION
"Courts must do the best they can to evaluate the likely effects of a particular
procedure, based on reason, principle, and common human experience."' 58 The
current presentation order, based on reason, detailed psychological analysis, and
common human experience, prejudices the defendant. The prejudice can be
profound and it is unnecessary. With little cost or state interest affected, courts
should begin to offer the defendant the first opportunity to building presumptions
for the jury to use in evaluating evidence the State claims establishes guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.
15 Ferguson v. Dyer, 77 N.E.2d 850, 857 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).
'5 Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.01(C), (F)) (alterations in original).
156 Id.
15s Id.
'ss Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976).
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